Abstract. In many situations we want to enjoy confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation of message simultaneously. One approach to achieve this objective is to "sign-then-encrypt" the message, or we can employ special cryptographic scheme like signcryption. Two open problems about identity-based (ID-based) signcryption were proposed in [16] . The first one is to devise an efficient forward-secure signcryption scheme with public verifiability and public ciphertext authenticity, which is promptly closed by [10] . Another one which still remains open is to devise a hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme that allows the user to receive signcrypted messages from sender who is under another sub-tree of the hierarchy. This paper aims at solving this problem by proposing two concrete constructions of hierarchical ID-based signcryption.
Introduction
In traditional public key infrastructure, certificates leak data and are not easily located. Strict online requirement removes offline capability, and validating policy is time-consuming and difficult to administer. Moreover, traditional PKI may not provide a good solution in many scenarios. For example, in tetherless computing architecture (TCA) [24] where two mobile hosts wanting to communicate might be disconnected from each other and also from the Internet. As exchange of public keys is impossible in this disconnected situation, identitybased (ID-based) cryptosystem fits in very well since the public key can be derived from the identity of another party [23] .
In many situations we want to enjoy confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation of message simultaneously. A traditional approach to achieve this objective is to "sign-thenencrypt" the message, or we can employ special cryptographic scheme like signcryption which can be more efficient in computation than running encryption and signature separately. A recent direction is to merge the concept of ID-based cryptography [22] and signcryption [26] . Two open problems about ID-based signcryption were proposed in [16] . The first one is to devise an efficient forward-secure signcryption scheme with public verifiability and public ciphertext authenticity, which is promptly closed by [10] . Another one which still remains open is to devise a hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme that allows the user to receive signcrypted messages from sender who is under another sub-tree of the hierarchy. This paper aims at solving this problem.
Applications
ID-based cryptography is suitable for the use of commercial organizations. In their settings, the inherent key-escrow of property is indeed beneficial, where the big boss has the power to monitor his/her employees' Internet communications if necessary. Hierarchical structure is common in nowadays' organizations, single trusted authority for generation of private key and authentication of users may be impractical, all these motivated the need of hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem.
Moreover, hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem is also useful in other scenarios, such as in TCA, a computing architecture with the concept of "regions", which can be viewed as a branch of the hierarchy [15, 23] .
Related Work
Malone-Lee gave the first ID-based signcryption scheme [18] . This scheme is not semantically secure as the signcrypted text produced is a concatenation of a signature by a variant of Hess's ID-based signature [14] and a ciphertext by a simplified version of Boneh and Franklin's IDbased encryption [4] . In short, the signature of the message is visible in the signcrypted message.
On the other hand, Nalla and Reddy's ID-based signcryption scheme [20] cannot provide public verifiability as well as public ciphertext authenticity since the verification can only be done with the knowledge of recipient's private key. Libert and Quisquater proposed three ID-based signcryption schemes [16] . None of them can satisfy the requirements for public verifiability and forward security at the same time.
Boyen's multipurpose ID-based signcryption scheme [5] is the first scheme that provides public verifiability and forward security and is also provably secure. However, this scheme aims at providing ciphertext unlinkability and anonymity. So, a third party cannot verify the origin of the ciphertext, thus the scheme does not satisfy the requirement of public ciphertext authenticity. We remark that Boyen's scheme is very useful in applications that require unlinkability and anonymity.
The public verifiability of the signcrypted message usually can only be checked with some ephemeral data computed by the intended recipient of the signcrypted message. The notion of verifiable pairing was introduced in [8] to ensure the non-repudiation property of the ID-based signcryption by disallowing the intended recipient to manipulate the ephemeral data.
In 2004, [19] claimed that they were the first one closing the open problem proposed by [16] ; however, the open problem was indeed closed by [10] in 2003. Recently, a simple but secure ID-based signcryption scheme was proposed in [7] and an ID-based signcryption scheme with exact security was proposed in [17] . The first blind ID-based signcryption scheme was proposed in [25] . This scheme offers the option to choose between authenticated encryption and ciphertext unlinkability. The generic group and pairing model was also introduced in this paper. Notice that none of the previously mentioned schemes works with hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem.
Preliminaries
Before presenting our results, we give the definition of a hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme by extending the framework in previous work (e.g. [10, 25] ). We also review the definitions of groups equipped with a bilinear pairing and the related complexity assumptions.
Framework of Hierarchical ID-based Signcryption Schemes
An ID-based signcryption (IDSC) scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, Extract, Sign, Encrypt, Decrypt and Verify. Setup and Extract are executed by the private key generators (PKGs henceforth). Based on the security level parameter, Setup is executed to generate the master secret and common public parameters. Extract is used to generate the private key for any given identity. The algorithm Sign is used to produce the signature of a signer on a message, it also outputs some ephemeral data for the use of Encrypt; Encrypt takes the message, the signature, the ephemeral data produced by Sign and the recipient's identity to produce a signcrypted text. Decrypt takes the input of secret key and decrypt the signcrypted text to give the message and the corresponding signature, finally Verify is used by any party to verify the signature of a message.
In the hierarchical ID-based signcryption (HIDSC henceforth), PKGs are arranged in a tree structure, the identities of users (and PKGs) can be represented as vectors. A vector of dimension represents an identity at depth . Each identity ID of depth is represented as an ID-tuple ID| = {ID 1 , · · · , ID }. The algorithms of HIDSC have similar functions to those of IDSC except that the Extract algorithm in HIDSC will generate the private key for a given identity which is either a normal user or a lower level PKG. The private key for identity ID of depth is denoted as S ID| (or S ID if the depth of ID does not related to the discussion). The functions of Setup, Extract, Sign, Encrypt, Decrypt and Verify in HIDSC are described as follows.
-Setup: Based on the input of a unary string 1 k where k is a security parameter, it outputs the common public parameters params, which include descriptions of a finite message space, a finite signature space and a finite signcrypted text space. It also outputs the master secret s, which is kept secret by the root private key generator (PKG). -Extract: Based on the input of an arbitrary identity ID of depth j, it makes use of the secret key S ID|j−1 (if j = 1, the input of the algorithm is s, which is the master secret of the root PKGs, instead of S ID|j−1 ) to output the private key S ID|j for ID. -Sign: Based on the input (M, S ID ), it outputs a signature σ and some ephemeral data r.
-Encrypt: Based on the input (M, S A , ID B , σ, r), it outputs a signcrypted message C.
-Decrypt: Based on the input (C, S B , ID B ), it outputs the message M , the corresponding signature σ and the purported signer ID A . -Verify: Based on the input (σ, M, ID), it outputs for "true" or ⊥ for "false", depending on whether σ is a valid signature of message M signed by ID or not.
These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint of hierarchical ID-based signcryption, i.e. if {σ, r} = Sign(M, S A ), C = Encrypt(S A , ID B , M, σ, r) and {M , ID A , σ } = Decrypt(C, S B ), we must have M = M , ID A = ID A and = Verify(σ , M, ID A ).
Bilinear Pairing
Let (G, ·) and (G 1 , ·) be two cyclic groups of prime order q and g be a generator of G. The bilinear pairing is given asê : G × G → G 1 , which satisfies the following properties:
There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(u, v) ∀u, v ∈ G.
Diffie-Hellman Problems
Definition 1. The computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) in G is defined as follows: Given a 3-tuple (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G 3 , compute g ab ∈ G. We say that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the CDHP in G.
Definition 2. The bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) in G is defined as follows: Given a 4-tuple (g, g a , g b , g c ) ∈ G 4 and a pairing functionê(·, ·), computeê(g, g) abc ∈ G 1 . We say that the (t, )-BDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the BDHP in G.
Definition 3. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDHP) in G is defined as follows: Given a 5-tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , T ) ∈ G 4 × G 1 and a pairing functionê(·, ·), decides whether T =ê(g, g) abc . We say that the (t, )-DBDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the DBDHP in G.
Security model
We present our security model for indistinguishability, existential unforgeability and ciphertext authenticity for HIDSC.
Indistinguishability
Indistinguishability for HIDSC against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is defined as in the following IND-CCA2 game.
1. The simulator selects the public parameter and sends the parameter to the adversary. 2. There are three oracles except the random oracles (hash oracles).
-Key extraction oracle KEO: Upon the input of an identity, the key extraction oracle outputs the private key corresponding to this identity. -Signcryption oracle SO: Upon the input of the message M , the sender ID A , the recipient ID B , the signcryption oracle produces a valid signcryption C. -Unsigncryption oracle UO: Upon the input of the ciphertext C, the sender ID A and the recipient ID B , the unsigncryption oracle outputs the decryption result and the verification outcome. The adversary is allowed to perform a polynomial number of oracle queries adaptively, but oracle query to KEO with input ID B is not allowed. Our security notion above is a strong one. It incorporates previous security notions including insider-security in [1] and indistinguishability in [18] .
Notice that if we set the adversary to send the recipient identity ID B to the simulator before step 1 (say, in an initialization stage) in the game, the security is reduced to the indistinguishability against selective identity, adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-sID-CCA2).
Existential unforgeability
Existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack (EU-CMA2) for HIDSC is defined as in the following EU-CMA2 game. The adversary is allowed to query the random oracles, KEO, SO and UO (which are defined above) with the restriction that oracle query to KEO with input ID A is not allowed.
The game is defined as follows:
1. The simulator selects the public parameter and sends it to the adversary. 2. The adversary is allowed to perform a polynomial number of oracle queries adaptively. 3. The adversary delivers a recipient identity ID B and a ciphertext C.
The adversary wins the game if he can produce a valid (C, ID B ) such that C can be decrypted, under the private key of ID B , to a message M , a sender identity ID A and a signature σ which passes the verification test and no SO request that resulted in a ciphertext C, whose decryption under the private key of ID B is the claimed forgery (σ, M, ID A ).
Definition 5. (Existential Unforgeability) A hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme is EU-CMA2 secure if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible probability in winning the EU-CMA2 game.
The adversary is allowed to get the private key of the recipient in the adversary's answer. This gives us an insider-security as defined in [1] .
Notice that if we set the adversary to send the sender identity ID A to the simulator in Step 1 in the game, the security is reduced to the existential unforgeability against selective identity, adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (EU-sID-CMA2).
Ciphertext Authenticity
Ciphertext authenticity against adaptive chosen message attack (AUTH-CMA2) for HIDSC is defined as in the following AUTH-CMA2 game. The adversary is allowed to query the random oracles, KEO, SO and UO, which are defined above. The game is defined as follows:
1. The simulator selects the public parameter and sends the parameter to the adversary. 2. The adversary is allowed to perform a polynomial number of oracle queries adaptively. 3. The adversary delivers a recipient identity ID B and a ciphertext C.
The adversary wins the game if he can produce a valid (C, ID B ) such that C can be decrypted, under the private key of ID B , to a message M , sender identity ID A and a signature σ which passes the verification test.
Oracle query to KEO with input ID A and ID B is not allowed. The adversary's answer (C, ID B ) should not be computed by SO before. Definition 6. (Ciphertext Authenticity) A hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme is AUTH-CMA2 secure if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible probability in winning the AUTH-CMA2 game.
Outsider-security is considered in this model since the adversary is not allowed to get the private key of the recipient in the adversary's answer. This model represents the attack where a signature is re-encrypted by using a public key with unknown secret key.
4 Scheme 1
Construction
Let be the number of levels of the hierarchy to be supported. Let H 1 , H 2 and H 3 be three cryptographic hash functions where H 1 : {0, 1} * → G and H 2 : {0, 1} * → G, and H 3 : G 1 → {0, 1} k 0 +k 1 +n where k 0 is the number of bits required to represent an element of G, k 1 is the maximum number of bits required to represent an identity (of depth ) and n is the maximum number of bits of a message to be signcrypted. Our first construction of a hierarchical ID-based signcryption scheme is given below. The construction is based on the idea in [13] .
Setup: On the input of a security parameter k ∈ N, the root PKG uses the BDH parameter generator [4] to generate G, G 1 , q andê(·, ·), where q is the order of groups G and G 1 . Then the root PKG executes the following steps.
1. Select an arbitrary generator P 0 from G. 2. Pick a random s 0 from Z p , which is the system's master secret key. 3. Compute Q 0 = P 0 s 0 . 4. The public system parameters are
KeyGen: For an entity with ID|k − 1 = {ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID k−1 } of depth k − 1 (for root PKG, its depth is defined as 0 and its identity is defined as empty string ), it uses its secret key S ID|k−1 (or the master secret s 0 of the root PKGs, if k = 1) to generate the secret key for a user ID|k (where the first k − 1 elements of ID|k are those in ID|k − 1) as follows.
2. Pick random s k−1 from Z p (this step is not necessary for the root PKG as s 0 is already defined). 3. Set the private key of the user to be
, where S ID|0 is defined as the identity element in G. 4. Send the values of Q i = P 0 s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 as "verification points" to the user.
Sign: For a user A|k = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A k } with secret key S A|k = k i=1 P A|i s i−1 and the points Q i = P 0 s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 to sign on a message M , he/she follows the steps below.
1. Pick a random number r from Z * p .
Compute
r } as the signature and return r as the ephemeral data for Encrypt.
Encrypt: To signcrypt the message M to user B|l, the steps below are used.
Pads the identity A with a chain of zero bits if it is not of depth .
whereĝ =ê(Q 0 , P B|1 ) ∈ G 1 and ⊕ represents the bitwise XOR.
Decrypt: For user B|l with secret key S B|l = l i=1 P B|i s i−1 and the points Q i = P 0 s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1 to decrypt the signcrypted message C, the steps below are used.
can do the following to verify its validity.
is defined as the identity element in G 1 .)
Efficiency Analysis
We first consider the communication efficiency of the scheme. The signcrypted message is shortened by one G 1 element, as compared with using the schemes HIDE and HIDS in [13] together. Moreover, the size of the signcrypted message can be further reduced if the sender and the receiver have a common low-level PKG ancestor. The modification incurred includes using a fixed s k−1 instead of a random one for each invocation of KeyGen. For verification side, since the sender and the receiver share some common "verification points", these points can be omitted from the transmission. For encryption side, the ciphertext size can be reduced by using the concept of "Dual-HIDE" in [13] , which can be seen as an extension of the concept of non-interactive key sharing in [22] . The basic idea behind non-interactive key sharing is that a same value can be computed either from the sender's private key and the recipient's public key or from the recipient's private key and the sender's public key. The sender is required to get his/her private key before the encryption can be done, but there is no practical difference in the case of signcryption since the sender who are going to sign the message must have his/her private key ready anyway. In our proposed construction, the "non-interactive agreed secret key" created by the sender ID whose the common ancestor with the receipt is at level m isê(S ID|m , P 0 ) =ê(P 0 , S ID )/ l i=m+1ê (Q i−1 , P ID|i ). To utilizing it, simply replaceĝ with this agreed secret key.
For the computational efficiency, chosen ciphertext secure HIDE requires the transformation in Section 3.2 of [13] , while our scheme does not require such transformation as the integrity checking of the ciphertext is obtained from the signature. Notice that the above modification from the concept of "Dual-HIDE" distributes the computational effort of the sender and that of the recipient in a more even way.
Security analysis
-If k = 1, the µ-th query to H 1 with k = 1 is back patched to g b . The corresponding identity is denoted as ID * b . Adds the entry < ID * b , g b > to tape L 1 and returns g b .
When there is a query on H 2 for input M , randomly picks λ ∈ Z p ; adds < M, λ > to L 2 and returns (g a ) λ . Query on H 3 is handled by producing a random element from the codomain, and adding both query and answer to tape L 3 .
Key Extraction Oracle (KEO): For input identity
-If A 1 = ID * b , then aborts the simulation. -Otherwise, look up at the tape L K =< ID 1 , · · · , ID u , α 1 , · · · , α u−1 > which stores the previously extracted keys. Let y be the maximal value such that
Note that the private key satisfies the required form.
Signcryption Oracle (SO): For input message M , sender A|k = {A 1 , · · · , A k }, and recipient B|l = {B 1 , · · · , B l }.
S puts < A|k, B|l, M, C > in L S . It is easy to see that the signature will pass the verification test:ê
-Otherwise, S retrieves the private key of A|k using the same way as KEO and then uses it to run signcryption and gets ciphertext C. S puts < A|k, B|l, M, C > in L S .
Un-signcryption Oracle (UO): For input sender
-For the case B 1 = ID * b , S finds if < A|k, B|l, M, C > is in L S . If so, returns M . Otherwise, S searches for all combinations < M, σ > such that < M, h 2 >∈ L 2 , < g , h 3 >∈ L 3 , for some h 2 , h 3 , under the constraints thatê(g, σ) =ê(g a , P A|1 )ê(Q M , h 2 ) k i=2ê (Q i−1 , P A|i ) and h 3 ⊕ V = M ||σ||A|k. S simply picks one of the valid message M from the above and return it as answer. If no such tuple is found, the oracle signals that the ciphertext is invalid.
-For other cases, S retrieves the private key of B|l using the same way as KEO and then uses it to decrypt and verify.
Witness Extraction: As in the IND-CCA2 game, at some point A chooses plaintext M 0 , M 1 , and sender A|k on which he wishes to be challenged. S retrieves the private key of A|k and Q 1 , · · · , Q k−1 , Q M using the same way as KEO. S queries P B|i from H 1 and obtain get λ Bi from < B 1 , · · · , B i , λ Bi >∈ L 1 , for 2 ≤ i ≤ l. S randomly picks V ∈ {0, 1} k 0 +k 1 +n and responds with challenge ciphertext
All further queries by A are processed adaptively as in the oracles above, with no private key extraction of B|l. Finally, A returns its final guess b . S ignores the answer from A, randomly picks an entry < g , h 3 > in L 3 , and returns g as the solution to the BDH problem. If the recipient identity is B|l = {B 1 , · · · , B l } with B 1 = ID * b , to recognize the challenge ciphertext is incorrect, A needs to query random oracle H 3 with g =ê(Q 0 , P B|1 ) c =ê(g, g) abc . It will leave an entry < g , h 3 > on L 3 , from which S can extract g =ê(g, g) abc .
Theorem 2. Suppose that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G, then the above scheme is (t , q S , q H , q E , q R , )-adaptive chosen message (EU-CMA2) secure for any t < t − o(t), > /e 2 q S q E .
Proof. Dealer D gives (g, g a , g b ) to Simulator S and wants S to compute g ab . Set g 1 = g a , g 2 = g b . The initialization, setup and the simulation of oracles are similar to those in the proof of Theorem 1. The difference is that probabilistic simulations are used in the simulation of two hash oracles: the one for hashing the identity (H 1 (·)) and the one for hashing the message (H 2 (·)).
Queries on oracle H 1 for identity (A 1 , · · · , A k ) : If k = 1, S embeds part of the challenge g b in the answer of many H 1 queries [12] . S picks λ ∈ R F * q and repeats the process until λ is not in the list L 1 . S then flips a coin W 1 ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability ζ 1 and 1 with probability 1 − ζ 1 . (ζ 1 will be determined in the probability analysis shortly afterward.) If W 1 = 0, then the hash value H 1 (A 1 ) is defined as g λ ; else returns
On the other hand, if k > 1, S performs the simulation as that in the proof of Theorem 1.
Queries on oracle H 2 for message M : In this case, S embeds the remaining part of the challenge g a in the answer of many H 2 queries. S picks β ∈ R F * q and repeats the process until β is not in the list L 2 . S then flips a coin W 2 ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability ζ 2 and 1 with probability 1 − ζ 2 . (ζ 2 will be determined later.) If W 2 = 0, then the hash value
Witness Extraction: After such probabilistic behaviour is introduced to the simulation, S will fail for the KEO query of (A 1 , · · · , A k ) if W 1 = 1 is found in the corresponding entry of A 1 in L 1 . The SO query for the signcryption of message M done by (A 1 , · · · , A k ) will fail too when W 1 = 1 and W 2 = 1 are found in the corresponding entry of A 1 in L 1 and M in L 2 respectively.
At the end of the game, A returns a forgery C = {U 2 , · · · , U l , V, Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q k−1 , Q M } which is the signcryption of message M done by (A 1 , · · · , A k ). S cannot solve the CDH problem if the forgery is not related to the problem instance at all, i.e. when W 1 = 0 is found in the corresponding entry of A 1 in the list L 1 and W 1 = 1 and W 2 = 0 are found in the corresponding entry of A 1 in L 1 and M in L 2 respectively. For successful cases, S gets the forged signature {σ, Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q k−1 , Q M } by the decryption of the signcrypted text. Suppose that λ i is the corresponding entry of P |i in the list L 1 and β is the corresponding entry of
Probability Analysis: The probability that S answers to all private key extraction queries is ζ 1 q E . S can answer all signcrypt queries for users H 1 (A 1 , · · · , A k ) where < A 1 , λ, 0 > is in the list L 1 , so the worst case for S to answer all signcrypt queries correctly happens when all signcrypt requests are for users H 1 (A 1 , · · · , A k ) where < A 1 , λ, 1 > is in the list L 1 . For these class of users, S can still signcrypt given the message is M where < M, β, 0 > can be found in the list L 2 , so the probability for S to successfully answer all signcrypt requests is ζ 2 q S .
Finally, the probability that A makes a forged signature for user H 1 (A 1 , · · · , A k ) where < A 1 , λ, 1 > is in the list L 1 is 1 − ζ 1 and the probability that A makes a forged signature on message M where (M, β, 1) is in the list L 2 is 1 − ζ 2 . Hence the probability for S to solve CDH problem successfully is f q E (ζ 1 )f q S (ζ 2 ) where f x (ζ) = ζ x (1 − ζ). Simple differentiation shows that f x (ζ) is maximized when ζ = 1 − (x + 1) −1 , and the corresponding probability is
. So the maximum probability for S to solve CDH problem successfully is
For large q S and q E , this probability is approximately equal to 1/e 2 q S q E .
Theorem 3. Suppose that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G, then the above scheme is (t , q S , q H , q E , q R , )-adaptive chosen message (AUTH-CMA2) secure for any t < t − o(t).
Proof. Dealer D gives (g, g a , g b , g c ) to Simulator S and wants S to computeê(g, g) abc . Set P 0 = g, Q 0 = g c . S sends the system parameter to A. S randomly picks µ a , µ b with 1 ≤ µ a , µ b ≤ q H .
-If k = 1, the µ a distinct query to H 1 with k = 1 is back patched to g a . The corresponding identity is denoted as ID * a . Adds the entry < ID * a , g a > to tape L 1 and returns g a . -If k = 1, the µ b distinct query to H 1 with k = 1 is back patched to g b . The corresponding identity is denoted as ID * b . Adds the entry < ID * b , g b > to tape L 1 and returns g b .
When there is a query on H 2 for input (A 1 , · · · , A k , M ), randomly picks λ ∈ Z p ; add < M, λ > to L 2 and returns (g c ) λ . Query on H 3 is handled by producing a random element from the codomain, and adding both query and answer as a single tuple to tape L 3 .
Key Extraction Oracle (KEO): For input identity
, aborts the simulation. Otherwise proceeds as in KEO of the proof of Theorem 1.
-If A 1 = ID * a and A 1 = ID * b , S retrieves the private key of A|k using the same way as KEO, then uses it to run signcryption and gets ciphertext C.
proceeds as in SO of the proof of Theorem 1. The only change is that S puts < A|k, B|l, M, C,
Un-signcryption Oracle (UO): For input sender
-If B 1 = ID * a or B 1 = ID * b , proceeds as in UO of the proof of Theorem 1. -Otherwise, S retrieves the private key of A|k using the same way as KEO and then uses it to decrypt and verify.
Witness Extraction: As in the AUTH-CMA2 game, finally A returns a recipient identity B|l and a ciphertext C. S does the followings:
-With probability q S /(q S + q R ) choose a random element from L S and a random element < g , h 3 > from L 3 . If the element chosen from L 3 has the form of < A|k, B|l, M, C, r >, L 1 and L 2 respectively. If the chosen element has the form of < B|l, A|k, M, C, r >, then compute as in the above with B|l substituting A|k if possible.
-With probability q R /(q S + q R ) choose a random element from L S and a random element < g , h 3 > from L 3 . If the element chosen from L 3 has the form of < A|k, B|l, M, C, r >,
On the other hand, if the chosen element has the
Now we analyze the simulation. Suppose that the SO responds to query (A|k, B|l, M ) and caused an entry < A|k, B|l, M, C, r > being added to L S , if σ is a valid signature, then
On the other hand, if the UO can decrypt with
5 Scheme 2
Construction
Let H be a cryptographic hash function where H : {0, 1} * → Z p . We use H(·) to hash the string representing the identity into an element in Z p k , the same hash function will be used in the signing algorithm too. Similar to [3] , H is not necessarily a full domain hash function. Notice that the identity string is hashed to Z p instead G in scheme 1, so we use I i to denote H(ID i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ , where is the number of levels of the hierarchy to be supported. Our second construction of HIDSC, based on the ideas in [9] and [3] , is given below.
Setup: On the input of a security parameter k ∈ N, the root PKG uses the BDH parameter [4] to generate G, G 1 , q andê(·, ·), where q is the order of groups G and G 1 . Then the root PKG executes the following steps.
1. Select α from Z * p , h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h from G and two generators g, g 2 from G * , 2. The public parameters are: {g,
KeyGen: For a user ID|k − 1 = {ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID k−1 } of depth k − 1, he/she uses his/her secret key d ID|k−1 to generate the secret key for a user ID|k (where the first k − 1 elements of ID|k are those in ID|k − 1) as follows.
Sign: For a user ID|k with secret key {g 2 α k j=1 F j (I j ) r j , g r 1 , · · · , g r k } to sign on a message M , he/she follows the steps below. Encrypt: To signcrypt a message M ∈ G 1 to user ID|l = {ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID l }, the ciphertext to be generated is
Decrypt: For a user ID |l with secret key
to decrypt the signcrypted text {u 1 , · · · , u l , v, w, y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y k , z}, he/she follows the steps below.
Verify: For ID|k = {ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID k }'s signature {σ, y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y k , z}, everyone can do the following to verify its validity.
Efficiency Analysis
We first analyze the computational efficiency. For the proposed scheme 1, admissible encoding scheme [4] are required for the hash function H 1 and H 2 , which is computationally expensive as such scheme requires log 2 (q/p)-bit scalar multiplication in E(F q ) where F q is the field on which G is based and p is the size of the group G. Using the example from [21] , if log 2 p = 512 and the embedding degree of pairing is 6, then log 2 q should be at least 2560 and hence 2048-bit scalar multiplication is needed. Scheme 2's hash function does not rely on such admissible encoding scheme. Moreover, chosen ciphertext secure HIDE requires the transformation in Section 4 of [6] , while our scheme does not require such transformation as the integrity checking of the ciphertext is obtained from the signature. For the communication efficiency of the scheme, the signcrypted message is shortened by one G 1 element, as compared with using the scheme in [9] and [3] together.
Security Analysis
Theorem 4. Suppose that the (t, )-Decision BDH assumption holds in G, then the above scheme is (t , q S , q H , q E , q R , )-selective identity, adaptive chosen ciphertext (IND-sID-CCA2) secure for any t < t − o(t).
Proof. Dealer D gives (g, g a , g b , g c , T ) to Simulator S and wants S to output 1 if T =ê(g, g) abc or output 0 otherwise. Set g 1 = g a , g 2 = g b , g 3 = g c .
Initialization: Adversary A sends an identity ID * = {ID 1 * , · · · , ID k * } ∈ Z k p of depth k ≤ that it intends to attack to S.
Setup: S randomly picks α 1 , · · · , α ∈ Z p and defines h j = g 1 −I * j g α j ∈ G for j = 1, · · · , . S sends the system parameter (g, g 1 , g 2 , h 1 , · · · , h ,ê(g 1 , g 2 ) ) to A. 
-Otherwise, randomly picks h ∈ Z p ; add (M, σ, h) to L and returns h.
Key Extraction Oracle (KEO): For input identity ID = {ID 1 , · · · , ID u } ∈ Z p u where u ≤ .
-If ID = ID * or ID is a prefix of ID * , then aborts the simulation.
-Otherwise, let j be the smallest index such that I j = I * j . S firstly derives a private key for identity {I 1 , · · · , I j }, from which it then construct a private key for ID. S randomly picks r 1 , · · · , r j ∈ Z p and sets:
is a valid random private key for (I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I j ). Let r j = r j − b/(I j − I * j ), then we have:
So the private key satisfies the required form.
Signcryption Oracle (SO): For input message M , sender ID A|k = {ID A1 , · · · , ID Ak }, and recipient ID B|l = {ID B1 , · · · , ID Bl }.
-If ID A|k equals ID * or a prefix of ID * , then S randomly chooses h ∈ Z p , and computes
Then S adds the tuple (M, σ, h) to L to force the random oracle
-Otherwise, S retrieves the private key of ID A|k using the same way as KEO and then uses it to run signcryption and gets ciphertext C. S puts
(y j , h j )) andê(w, F j (I Bj )) = e(g, u j ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. S simply picks a message in one of the valid M in the above and return it as the answer. If no such tuple is found, the oracle signals that the ciphertext is invalid.
-For other cases, S retrieves the private key of ID A|k using the same way as KEO and then uses it to decrypt and verify.
Witness Extraction: As in the IND-sID-CCA2 game, at some point A chooses plaintext M 0 , M 1 , and sender ID A|k on which he wishes to be challenged. S picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with challenge ciphertext C = {g 3
where (y 1 , · · · , y k , z) is a valid signature from ID A|k . All further queries by A are processed adaptively as in the oracles above. Finally, A returns its final guess b . If b = b , then S outputs 1 meaning T =ê(g, g) abc . Otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T =ê(g, g) abc .
If the recipient identity is ID * , then the value ofê(g 1 , g 2 ) s is equal toê(g a , g b ) c =ê(g, g) abc . If A has the advantage to guess b correctly, then S has the advantage to solve the DBDHP.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G, then the above scheme is (t , q S , q H , q E , q R , )-selective identity, adaptive chosen message (EU-sID-CMA) secure for any t < t − o(t), > · (1 − q S (q H + q S )/q). D gives (g, g a , g b ) to Simulator S and wants S to compute g ab . Set g 1 = g a , g 2 = g b . The initialization, setup and the simulation of oracles are the same as the proof of Theorem 4. At the end of the game, A returns a forgery C = {u 1 , · · · , u l , v, w, y 1 , · · · , y k , z} using h from H query. By forking lemma, we rewind A to the time when the H query was issued and get C = {u 1 , · · · , u l , v , w , y 1 , · · · , y k , z } using h from H query. We can get d j = (y j /y j ) (h−h ) −1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Then we can calculate d 0 = (z/z ) (h−h ) −1 . Finally we can get g 2 α = d 0 / k j=1 d j α j which is the solution to the CDH problem. Let us consider the possibility for SO to fail. The only possibility for introducing an error is in defining H(M, σ) which is already defined. Since σ takes its value uniformly at random in G 1 , the chance for the occurrence of one of these events is at most (q H + q S )/q for each query. Therefore over the whole simulation, the chance of an error is at most q S (q H + q S )/q. Hence S succeeds with probability at least · (1 − q S (q H +q S ) q ).
Proof. (Sketch) Dealer
Theorem 6. Suppose that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G, then the above scheme is (t , q S , q H , q E , q R , )-selective identity, adaptive chosen message (AUTH-sID-CMA2) secure for any t < t − o(t).
Proof. (Sketch) By the construction of the game of AUTH-CMA2, we can see that if an adversary wants to win the game, he either forges a signature from a signer or forges an encryption using a valid signature. For the first case, by theorem 5, if an adversary can forge a signature in the above scheme, then he can solve the CDH problem.
For the second case, let the adversary gets a signature {s, y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y k , z}, where y j = d j s+h , for j = {1, 2, · · · , k} and z = d 0 s+h , and getsê(g 1 , g 2 ) s , g s from the corresponding signcryption with recipient identity not ID B|l = {ID B1 , · · · , ID Bl }. Then the adversary needs to forge an encryption by computing {F 1 (I B1 ) s , F 2 (I B2 ) s , · · · , F l (I Bl ) s } from the knowledge of {F 1 (I B1 ), F 2 (I B2 ), · · · , F l (I Bl ),ê(g 1 , g 2 ), g}. This is the same as the CDH problem. Therefore, if an adversary wants to win the game, he has to solve the CDH problem.
Conclusion
Two concrete constructions of hierarchical identity based signcryption are proposed, which closed the open problem proposed by [16] . Our schemes are provably secure under the random oracle model [2] . Moreover, our schemes do not require transformation which is necessary for the case of hierarchical identity based encryption as the integrity checking of the ciphertext is obtained from the signature. We believe that hierarchical identity based signcryption schemes are useful in nowadays commercial organization and also in new network architecture such as tetherless computing architecture. Future research directions include further improvement on the efficiency of hierarchical identity based signcryption schemes and achieving other security requirements such as public ciphertext authenticity ( [10, 16] ) or ciphertext anonymity ( [5] ).
